Consequences of regime attack in Idlib

By M. Seyfettin Erol for Anadolu Agency Analysis Department Translated by Anadolu Agency English News Service ISTANBUL The Idlib issue is, once again, on the agenda. The Assad regime attacked reinforcement Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) elements sent to the region to prevent armed conflict, martyring seven soldiers and one civilian and injuring 13 others, raising tensions in the region. Turkey’s response certainly has and will not be limited to Syria, as the message sent to Turkey through Idlib is not limited to Syria alone. Thus, the regime attack seems to have triggered the beginning of a process that will result in major shifts in Turkish foreign policy and global/regional-scale geopolitics. In this regard, it is important to point out that the Assad regime’s attack not only targeted the TAF, but also the Astana and Sochi processes -- which were based on the cooperation of Turkey, Russia and Iran. This regime attack also confirmed that some concerns and warnings previously voiced by Turkey were not groundless. Therefore, it is clear that this attack will affect Turkish-Russian relations, as well as the Turkey-Russia-Iran cooperation process. Russia and Iran are the two key powers behind the Assad regime. Of these two, it does not seem plausible that the Assad regime would be able to act without the knowledge and approval of Russia, in particular. Assessments to the contrary cannot be taken seriously. Its timing also gives clues about the purpose of the attack itself. Taking a closer look at the developments prior to the attack, we find the following important points; Turkey’s success in reaching its goals to a considerable extent in the context of the Syrian crisis, increasing its capacity to safeguard its borders; Ankara’s ability to strike a balance between the U.S. and Russia on the field and the negotiation table, managing the process in a way that prevented a deep crisis with the U.S. (causing "disappointment" among of certain groups); Turkey’s redirection of its energy in Syria to other crisis areas, increasing activity in North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean and affecting Turkish-Russian relations on Libya; Ankara’s strong reaction to the “Deal of the Century” and its repercussions on the field; Developments in Turkish-Ukrainian relations, Turkey’s deal-breaker / play-maker role, its increasing capacity and resulting disturbances; Ankara’s increasing impact on the regional-global scale and its turning into an indocile actor. Therefore, this attack is not a surprise. The surprise will be hidden in the potential resulting developments, especially in what Turkey’s response will be. What does this regime attack in Idlib mean? Why was the attack carried out now? What sorts of messages did it carry? What kind of process could it have triggered? How might Turkey respond to the attack? What types of options does Ankara have? Turkey-Russia-Iran at a crossroads? On Sept. 8, 2018, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s official Twitter account read: "If the world turns a blind eye to the killing of tens of thousands of innocent people to further the regime’s interests, we will neither watch from the sidelines nor participate in such a game." President Erdogan made this statement in five languages: Turkish, Arabic, English, Russian and Persian, right after his return from the tense Tehran Summit. There was clearly deep meaning behind the announcement being published in Russian and Persian. The developments in the Tehran leg of the Astana process rendered Astana “a lame duck” for Turkey. The name of the crisis was “Idlib.” Iran’s insistence on the Idlib issue through Russia pointed to nothing less than a “fracture.” Such a fracture was prevented via the Erdogan-Putin meeting in Sochi on Sept. 17, 2018, with the crisis freezing when the Sochi agreement was signed following deliberations between the two leaders. At the least, the collaboration between Turkey and Russia was preserved, with the sides deciding to continue with the extended Eurasia-centered cooperation aiming to create a multipolar globe, which was signed on Nov. 16, 2001, and revitalized on June 27, 2019. However, the developments regarding Idlib during the Syrian civil war started revealing that the deep crisis between Turkey and Russia had only been suspended and that it was only the tip of the iceberg. Russia’s indecisiveness regarding the latest developments in Ukraine and also the Eastern Mediterranean--Black Sea line points to a rough future for Turkish-Russian bilateral relations. In addition, the Iran factor also affects the Turkish-Russian relations in Syria to the same extent as the regime. The opinion in Ankara following the Tehran Summit is that Russia and Iran are together looking to make a new play in the region through Assad. The role ascribed to Idlib in this play is important in pointing to the persistence over the region. In fact, regime and Russia-Iran backed forces are waging war on Turkey and the military forces that Turkey is supporting, rather than fighting against the PYD-YPG/PKK terror organizations threatening to the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of Syria. An important but often overlooked matter is the fact that the U.S. is not the only party uncomfortable with Turkish-Russian cooperation. The developments which took place during this process made Moscow -- who, with the Assad regime forces, also targeted the TAF -- even more prominent. The policies of Iran, which made its attitude towards Turkey clear at the Tehran Summit, along with Russia’s response to these policies, are critical for the future of Turkish-Russian relations. It is clear that Russia has reached the end of its management of the related parties in the region, starting with Aleppo, as this “management” policy is beginning to work against Turkey. Russia’s approach toward the TAF during these developments is also remarkable. Claiming that Moscow had not been informed of Turkey’s deployment of reinforcements, the Russian Defense Ministry said in a quite thought-provoking statement: "Turkish military units made movements inside the Idlib de-escalation zone on the night from Feb. 2 to Feb. 3 without warning the Russian side and came under fire from Syrian government forces aimed against terrorists in the area west of the village of Seracab [Saraqib]."