ID :
205891
Thu, 09/08/2011 - 02:09
Auther :

WikiLeaks on Korea Leaks should not cut communication channels

A number of WikiLeaks??? revelations on Korea contain nothing surprising as most of the U.S. cables were similar to news reported by the local media. There are no indications that American diplomats had used unconventional methods of bribery, threats, high-handedness, conspiracy or coercion.
One cable showed that two confidantes of President Lee Myung-bak ??? Choi Si-jung, chairman of the Korea Communications Commission and former Unification Minister Hyun In-taek ??? had informed the U.S. of Seoul's decision to import American beef before the summit between Lee and George Bush in January, 2008.
It indicates the Lee administration's mistaken decision had not anticipated the ensuing three-month candlelight protests. The briefing itself is not a leak of sensitive state intelligence, but policy failures of the Seoul government.
Trade Minister Kim Hyun-chong lobbied Seoul officials to help solve the concerns of American pharmaceutical companies in resetting the nation???s pricing policy.
Choi, Hyun, and Kim are mistakenly portrayed in the local media as traitors for representing U.S. interest.
Lamentable is the lack of Seoul's submission of its wish list to Washington in return for Korea???s accommodation of the American requests. Consoling is the absence of U.S. pressure on Korea to buy American military equipment contrary to the prevailing public myth.
A Cheong Wa Dae national security secretary Kim Tae-hyo told U.S. diplomats in December, 2008 that the Hankyoreh and MBC were among two or three media outlets critical of President Lee Myung-bak's hawkish North Korea policy. It is doubtful whether this is intelligence.
That cable has no information about whether the Lee administration had exercised any influence to tame the media to justify its hostile North Korea policy.
Surprising is a lack of information on the Seoul-Washington dialogue on North Korea???s nuclear weapons and coordination in inter-Korean relations. No philosophical discussion on the future of East Asia is apparent. The cable did not mention a U.S. assessment of the prevailing Korean sentiment on Dokdo and the U.S. official calling the East Sea the Sea of Japan.
American diplomats only dug issues of commercial interest and gossip-like tips. No cables have emerged with information on human rights violations. They seem to only hear the views of the incumbent administration, not those of the opposition and NGO leaders. They appeared to be at pains not to give the impression of meddling in internal affairs.
Another cable quoted two Seoul professors as being skeptical of Rep. Park Geun-hye's becoming the next President. American diplomats met Korean fortune tellers, not experts.
The WikiLeaks revelations will make diplomats and officials reluctant to meet each other. The ensuing lack of information might create undue misunderstanding. Behind-the-scene dialogue is all about the diplomacy of giving and taking. Branding all Korean tipsters as sycophants to Washington might risk in misunderstandings. The WikiLeaks disclosures will make bilateral relations more transparent now than before. Shocking in the WikiLeaks cables is the lack of surprises and tension in the Korea-U.S. relations.

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