ID :
54037
Mon, 04/06/2009 - 07:50
Auther :
Shortlink :
https://www.oananews.org//node/54037
The shortlink copeid
After the launch: Seoul should play creative role in regional diplomacy
Like most events that had been foreseen for too long, North Korea's eventual rocket launch Sunday was closer to an anticlimax.
It's bad enough Pyongyang has finally taken the action of what it says was
propelling a satellite into orbit, but most of the outside world believes it was
an effort to get nearer to the title of nuclear power, complete with long-range
weapons delivery systems.
This is lamentable not so much because the isolationist regime defied the wishes
of most other countries but because it could hurt everyone, including not only
its presumed adversaries of South Koreans, Japanese and Americans but also its
own people in the long run, for the sake of a handful of leaders and military
brass.
Everyone knows the space satellite is just another ??? or previous ??? name for
an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Even if we take the North's
allegation that all this is for the peaceful use of space at face value, it's no
easier to understand Pyongyang's behavior of looking up the sky while many of its
people are starving on earth.
It's a relief in this regard to watch most of Pyongyang's counterparts react with
a calmer and more cool-headed approach than they had pledged, with the probable
exception of Japan, whose seeming overreaction was attributed by regional experts
to domestic political circumstances, in the way they viewed the communist
country's test-fire. Tokyo did not try to intercept the flying object, as no
debris fell on its land ??? as expected.
Seoul fell short, wisely, of announcing its full-scale participation into the
U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which otherwise might have
unnecessarily accelerated tension on the Korean Peninsula.
Most noteworthy was the U.S. reaction as always, and President Barack Obama
seemed to stop at making remarks based on the long-kept U.S. positions, defining
the North's move as ``provocative'' and predicting it would ``further isolate''
Pyongyang from the international community.
North Korean leaders might find it quite disappointing that Obama seemingly ruled
out the possibility for any immediate bilateral dialogue with these comments. If
the history of Washington-Pyongyang negotiations is any guide, however, America
can revert to a ``realistic awareness'' anytime without much of a prior signal.
And this is exactly where South Korea's role becomes important. Despite political
rhetoric about ``blood allies'' between the U.S. and South Korea, Washington has
mostly preferred Seoul as a mediator rather than a stumbling block, whether
America took engagement or containment policies with respect to the communist
country.
Experts of international politics share the view in doubting South Korea's
diplomatic usefulness for the U.S. if the former has little access to North Korea
and China like now.
For Kim Jong-il and his coterie, the Lee administration could be a savior, as the
latter has given cause for Pyongyang to revert to the iron-fisted rule at a time
when Kim's leadership was shaken both due to his bad health and the ``southern
sunshine'' permeating through Gaeseong and Mt. Geumgang over the past decade.
This is no time for the government to parrot ``airtight'' alliance with the
United States, but read into what the new administration in Washington has in
mind in the context of a new world order, particularly in which China is emerging
as one of the G2. If there were a time when Seoul needed diplomatic creativity
and initiatives more than ever, it is now.
(END)
It's bad enough Pyongyang has finally taken the action of what it says was
propelling a satellite into orbit, but most of the outside world believes it was
an effort to get nearer to the title of nuclear power, complete with long-range
weapons delivery systems.
This is lamentable not so much because the isolationist regime defied the wishes
of most other countries but because it could hurt everyone, including not only
its presumed adversaries of South Koreans, Japanese and Americans but also its
own people in the long run, for the sake of a handful of leaders and military
brass.
Everyone knows the space satellite is just another ??? or previous ??? name for
an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Even if we take the North's
allegation that all this is for the peaceful use of space at face value, it's no
easier to understand Pyongyang's behavior of looking up the sky while many of its
people are starving on earth.
It's a relief in this regard to watch most of Pyongyang's counterparts react with
a calmer and more cool-headed approach than they had pledged, with the probable
exception of Japan, whose seeming overreaction was attributed by regional experts
to domestic political circumstances, in the way they viewed the communist
country's test-fire. Tokyo did not try to intercept the flying object, as no
debris fell on its land ??? as expected.
Seoul fell short, wisely, of announcing its full-scale participation into the
U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which otherwise might have
unnecessarily accelerated tension on the Korean Peninsula.
Most noteworthy was the U.S. reaction as always, and President Barack Obama
seemed to stop at making remarks based on the long-kept U.S. positions, defining
the North's move as ``provocative'' and predicting it would ``further isolate''
Pyongyang from the international community.
North Korean leaders might find it quite disappointing that Obama seemingly ruled
out the possibility for any immediate bilateral dialogue with these comments. If
the history of Washington-Pyongyang negotiations is any guide, however, America
can revert to a ``realistic awareness'' anytime without much of a prior signal.
And this is exactly where South Korea's role becomes important. Despite political
rhetoric about ``blood allies'' between the U.S. and South Korea, Washington has
mostly preferred Seoul as a mediator rather than a stumbling block, whether
America took engagement or containment policies with respect to the communist
country.
Experts of international politics share the view in doubting South Korea's
diplomatic usefulness for the U.S. if the former has little access to North Korea
and China like now.
For Kim Jong-il and his coterie, the Lee administration could be a savior, as the
latter has given cause for Pyongyang to revert to the iron-fisted rule at a time
when Kim's leadership was shaken both due to his bad health and the ``southern
sunshine'' permeating through Gaeseong and Mt. Geumgang over the past decade.
This is no time for the government to parrot ``airtight'' alliance with the
United States, but read into what the new administration in Washington has in
mind in the context of a new world order, particularly in which China is emerging
as one of the G2. If there were a time when Seoul needed diplomatic creativity
and initiatives more than ever, it is now.
(END)