Japan-U.S. secret pacts confirmed, paving way for gov't policy shift+

TOKYO, March 9 Kyodo -
A Foreign Ministry panel concluded Tuesday that secret pacts on nuclear arms
and other issues were reached by Japan and the United States in the Cold War
era, paving the way for the Japanese government to end its decades-long
official denial of their existence.

With the panel confirming ''a tacit agreement'' that led Tokyo to allow U.S.
nuclear-armed vessels to visit Japanese ports, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada
said he cannot rule out the possibility that nuclear weapons were brought into
Japan in the past while vowing that Japan will uphold its so-called three
non-nuclear principles.
The expert panel, headed by University of Tokyo professor Shinichi Kitaoka,
looked into four alleged secret pacts, including the nuclear weapons deal, and
recognized three as secretly reached agreements. Okada told a press conference
that in his opinion, the fourth alleged agreement can also be seen as a secret
pact.
But Okada said he does not expect the outcome of the panel investigation to
affect bilateral security arrangements, which are going through a difficult
patch over the issue of relocating a U.S. base in Okinawa.
While the pacts have already been exposed through declassified U.S. documents
and other sources, the investigation, launched following the change of
government in Japan last year, made clear that previous governments were
''dishonest'' over the issue and raised questions over the management and
disclosure of diplomatic documents.
''It is regrettable that this issue has not been revealed to the public...for
such a long time,'' Okada said, adding he expects the report ''will contribute
to restoring public trust over diplomacy.''
Among the secret pacts acknowledged by the panel was the tacit agreement that
emerged during the revision of the Japan-U.S security treaty in 1960, which led
Japan effectively to allow port calls by U.S. vessels carrying nuclear weapons
without prior consultation.
The prior consultation system required Washington to consult with Tokyo in
advance on the ''introduction'' of nuclear weapons, given the strong
antinuclear sentiment among the Japanese public following the U.S. atomic
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.
With the murky aspects of the bilateral security arrangements finally brought
to light on the Japanese side, with about 330 documents newly declassified, the
report revealed that the non-nuclear principles of not possessing, producing or
allowing nuclear weapons on its territory were a mere facade.
Japan had so far said that as prior consultations had never taken place, no
nuclear weapons had been brought into Japan. However, Okada effected a change
in the official view, saying, ''We cannot clearly state that nuclear weapons
were not brought into (Japan).''
In the report, the panel looked into both narrowly and broadly defined secret
pacts. Those in a narrow sense are documented, while those in a broad sense,
not necessarily backed by papers, were agreed tacitly and have important
content differing from official agreements.
Of the remaining three pacts, the panel acknowledged that there was a secret
pact that allowed Washington to use U.S. military bases in Japan without prior
consultation in the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula as well as a
pact covering cost burdens for the 1972 reversion of Okinawa to Japan from U.S.
control.
But it said another alleged pact to allow Washington to bring nuclear weapons
into Okinawa in times of emergency does not fit the definitions of a secret
pact as it is unlikely that it goes far beyond the content of the 1969
Japan-U.S. statement on the Okinawa reversion.
As for the secret nuclear deal, the panel concluded that, at the time of
revising their security treaty, Japan and United States ''intentionally''
avoided further pursuing whether the entry of U.S. vessels into Japanese ports
would be subject to prior consultations so as not to disrupt their alliance.
''By leaving the issue ambiguous, (U.S.) ships carrying nuclear weapons could
stop at Japanese ports without prior consultation, while Japan, as its official
stance, could deny such a development. But neither side would make a protest,''
the report noted.
Such a tacit agreement, or ''secret pact in a broad sense,'' became fixed after
U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer told Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira
in 1963 that Washington did not consider the port calls as subject to prior
consultation.
While aware of the high probability that U.S. nuclear-armed ships might visit
its ports, Japan did not make any protests and continued to explain to the Diet
that port calls would be subject to prior consultation, according to the
report.
''The Japanese government offered dishonest explanations, including lies, from
beginning to end. This attitude should not have been allowed under the
principle of democracy,'' the panel said.
But the panel also pointed out it was not easy in those days to achieve a
balance ''between a nuclear deterrence strategy under the Cold War era and the
Japanese people's antinuclear sentiments.''
The report noted that following U.S. President George H.W. Bush's post-Cold War
announcement in 1991 that the United States would withdraw tactical nuclear
weapons from its vessels, the port call issue no longer troubles Japan-U.S.
ties.
Referring to the U.S. policy, Okada said, ''Thus, after 1991, I don't think
nuclear weapons would be brought in in the form of port calls.''
On an agreement that allowed Washington to use U.S. military bases in Japan in
the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula, the panel said that while
it found a document proving its existence, it is no longer in effect.
On the cost burden related to the Okinawa reversion, the panel said a secret
pact in a broad sense can be confirmed, under which Tokyo gave consent to
shouldering $4 million in costs the United States was supposed to pay to
restore to their original state Okinawa land plots that U.S. forces had used.
Meanwhile, the panel proposed the ministry consider ways to ensure that it
follows its basic policy of disclosing 30-year-old diplomatic documents -- for
example, by assigning more staff to handle the task.
It also labeled as undesirable the situation whereby, for a long period,
accounts of Japan's diplomatic history are found mainly in the records of other
countries.
Okada said that he had decided to set up a task force on disclosure and
management of diplomatic records and would like to consider measures to improve
the situation.
The expert report also expressed regret that many key documents were found to
be missing, and called for further investigations amid a media report that
there was an internal order at the ministry to dispose of some documents
related to the secret nuclear pact.
==Kyodo
2010-03-09 23:27:55