Ministry viewed nukes entry into Japan as effective deterrent in 1960s

TOKYO, July 7 Kyodo -
The Foreign Ministry created an internal document in the 1960s positing that
allowing the United States to bring nuclear weapons into Japan would be
''effective'' in deterring nuclear attacks on Japan despite Tokyo's nonnuclear
principles, according to diplomatic records declassified Wednesday.
The document, created by the ministry's intelligence analysis section in 1968,
said there was ''zero guarantee that Japan would remain free from a nuclear
attack by adhering to its three nonnuclear principles'' of not possessing,
producing or allowing nuclear weapons on its territory.
On the status of U.S.-occupied Okinawa after its reversion to Japan, which was
not realized until 1972, the document said Japan could not help but approach
the matter on the premise of the United States' unrestricted use of its bases
there. Such use was taken as including the introduction of nuclear weapons.
In 1967, then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato proclaimed the three nonnuclear
principles, reflecting the Japanese people's aversion to nuclear weapons that
stemmed from the two U.S. atomic bombings on Japan during World War II. But the
document hints that there were qualms about the principles within the ministry
shortly after the proclamation.
It also indicates that there were calls within the ministry for accepting the
introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons into Okinawa.
The three nonnuclear principles became a mere facade after Japan effectively
allowed U.S. nuclear-armed vessels to visit Japanese ports without prior
consultation through a secret agreement.
The document, which offers analyses of Japan's security, was created by what is
now an office supervised by the director general of the Intelligence and
Analysis Service and was dated May 23, 1968.
It defined the nuclear deterrent provided by the United States as the basis of
Japan's security, rejecting an option for Japan to own nuclear weapons on the
grounds that the United States would not welcome the move and that the economic
burdens accompanying the option would be enormous.
Given that there was no guarantee that Japan would not face nuclear attacks or
be involved in a conflict if it held fast to the nonnuclear principles, the
document said that it would be effective for Japan to allow nuclear weapons
into its territory as West Germany did.
''That is the logical conclusion from the pure perspective of deterrence,'' it
said.
The document still said it would be unwise to review the principles given the
Japanese public's aversion to nuclear weapons. But it stressed that it was
important to formulate policies ''not influenced by preconceptions'' and that
it was necessary to ''educate and enlighten'' the public on the country's
security.
The policy of automatically disclosing diplomatic records was ordered by
Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada following a recent official probe that found
documents expected to shed light on the existence of a secret nuclear agreement
between Japan and the United States had somehow gone missing.
The 8,100 pages of records disclosed Wednesday consist of eight files
concerning the revision of the Japan-U.S. security treaty in 1960 and 29 files
concerning the reversion of U.S.-occupied Okinawa to Japan in 1972.
The records were reviewed last month by a ministry panel that includes outside
experts and their disclosure was subsequently approved by Okada. They can be
accessed at the ministry's Diplomatic Record Office in Tokyo.
About 22,000 files preserved at the ministry are expected to be disclosed over
the next three to four years after being reviewed by the panel, which will meet
every three months.
==Kyodo