(EDITORIAL from Korea Herald on Nov. 5)

Future of North

North Korea released several still photographs of Kim Jong-il this week in an
apparent attempt to quell rampant speculations in South Korea and overseas about
the health of the supreme leader. But the pictures, which purportedly show him
watching a soccer match between two units of the People's Army, rather increased
doubts about his physical status.
In those pictures, Kim was sitting or standing on his own but his left hand
looked limp -- a sign of the aftereffects of a stroke. The state television
station only showed still photos and no video footage. The Pyongyang
propagandists' latest publicity move for their leader made us reasonably sure
that the 66-year-old chairman has not fully recovered from whatever illness that
struck him sometime after Aug. 14, when he was last seen publicly.
The physical infirmity of the leader adds to the impression of instability of the
North Korean regime, whose faltering economy has developed cracks in the system,
with numerous residents crossing the border into China to avoid starvation and
repression, and thousands eventually reaching South Korea every year. The poor
country looks ever more fragile under the magnetic pull of free, affluent South
Korea, open and prosperous China and capitalist Russia.
The collapse of the North Korean regime has been contemplated by outside watchers
since the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, which halted the generous aid it got
from its communist allies China and Russia. The death in 1994 of Kim Il-sung, who
had founded the regime with Soviet support, and natural disasters that devastated
farming in the North year after year, pushed the regime toward what it dubbed a
"march of sufferings."
North Korea still exists, in part thanks to humanitarian aid from South Korea and
other countries, and in part due to the still effective internal control system,
but a regime collapse remains a possibility. However, a significant change has
taken place over the years since the end of the Cold War.
It was confidently assumed among South Koreans during the 1990s that a collapse
of the North would automatically lead to its absorption by the South. Now, more
than a decade later, not many here believe so; opinion polls indicate a growing
proportion of South Koreans consider China's intervention in the event of a North
Korean collapse a definite possibility.
The change of notion reflects two distinct realities. The first is the rise of
China in economic power over the intervening years, and the accompanying growth
of its international influence. The second is the South Korean people's general
reluctance to accept any new situation in the North that might affect their
lifestyle. Differing approaches to the unification issue by successive
administrations in Seoul have left the southern public somewhat disenchanted with
instant integration with the destitute North.
Whatever happens, reunification of the Korean Peninsula should be the ultimate
goal of Koreans. The present government needs to draw up a realistic vision of a
unified Korea for its people and to renew efforts to convince the international
community that any transitional situation following the collapse of the North
Korean regime should not deter Seoul's control over the whole peninsula.
It is time that the government sought to produce an international pact to achieve
this -- either through the framework of the existing six-party talks or the newly
introduced regular summits between Seoul, Beijing and Tokyo. This agreement must
guarantee the independent unification of the Korean Peninsula in the event of a
regime collapse in the North, excluding the intervention of China or other
powers.
(END)