ID :
29110
Sat, 11/08/2008 - 15:18
Auther :
Shortlink :
https://www.oananews.org//node/29110
The shortlink copeid
Seoul should hurry to restore lost diplomatic leverage
U.S. President-elect Barack Obama said Friday the strengthened alliance between America and Korea was the "cornerstone" of Asian peace and stability.
One could class this remark as just more diplomatic rhetoric, but the comment
hits the mark in that the Korean Peninsula is one of the few regions in the world
??? let alone in East Asia ??? where two hostile states are still technically at
war.
Obama's remark, which came during his first telephone conversation with President
Lee Myung-bak, can also be interpreted as expressing the new U.S. leader's hope
that Seoul will play a more positive role in Asia, for instance by dispatching
troops to countries mired in military conflict such as Afghanistan.
This is a hard pill to swallow for President Lee, who will find it difficult to
persuade Koreans to resend soldiers to the war-torn South Asian country, from
which Seoul withdrew its troops in the wake of a hostage nightmare last year.
It would be natural for Korea to play a greater political role congruous with its
enhanced economic power, by augmenting its operations as part of international
peacekeeping forces in troubled parts of the world. Seoul needs to be more
cautious, however, in responding to calls for help in conflicts that can be
viewed as local in nature, including the U.S. war against terrorism, which is
gaining varied levels of support from different governments. The ultimate
criteria should be how justifiable its causes are and, if so, the sacrifice each
participant should make.
Korean officials' interests are naturally drawn more to how the new U.S.
administration will deal with North Korea, including the communist regime's
denuclearization. And their greatest concern is being left out in the cold in a
possible rapid thaw of frozen ties between Washington and Pyongyang.
A summit between Obama and Kim Jong-il anytime soon may be a premature idea but
no one knows exactly what the next U.S. president will do for a breakthrough in
one of the most estranged diplomatic relationship on the planet. Some scenarios
even presume the new White House may try to reverse course, by normalizing ties
first to automatically disarm the isolationist regime.
Analysts here regard the North Korean media's frequent photo releases of their
reportedly convalescing leader as Pyongyang's signal that Kim is able and willing
to accept any olive branch from the Democratic administration.
Most hard to understand is what makes the Lee administration so hesitant to get
out of its own diplomatic snare. It was somewhat understandable for conservative
Lee to try to differ from his liberal predecessor by becoming harsher on the
North, which was also aimed in part to take the initiative in inter-Korean
rivalry.
But nine months are enough for Lee to have been engaged in a war of nerves for
nothing. In the worst case scenario, Lee will follow in the footsteps of the
former Kim Young-sam administration, which was left with a bill for a light-water
reactor while never playing a corresponding role in the nuclear settlement.
The change in U.S. political power is both a cause and opportunity for Seoul to
turn around and regain lost diplomatic leverage. Nothing but the Lee
administration's unproductive, shortsighted policy is marginalizing Seoul in
regional diplomacy.
(END)
One could class this remark as just more diplomatic rhetoric, but the comment
hits the mark in that the Korean Peninsula is one of the few regions in the world
??? let alone in East Asia ??? where two hostile states are still technically at
war.
Obama's remark, which came during his first telephone conversation with President
Lee Myung-bak, can also be interpreted as expressing the new U.S. leader's hope
that Seoul will play a more positive role in Asia, for instance by dispatching
troops to countries mired in military conflict such as Afghanistan.
This is a hard pill to swallow for President Lee, who will find it difficult to
persuade Koreans to resend soldiers to the war-torn South Asian country, from
which Seoul withdrew its troops in the wake of a hostage nightmare last year.
It would be natural for Korea to play a greater political role congruous with its
enhanced economic power, by augmenting its operations as part of international
peacekeeping forces in troubled parts of the world. Seoul needs to be more
cautious, however, in responding to calls for help in conflicts that can be
viewed as local in nature, including the U.S. war against terrorism, which is
gaining varied levels of support from different governments. The ultimate
criteria should be how justifiable its causes are and, if so, the sacrifice each
participant should make.
Korean officials' interests are naturally drawn more to how the new U.S.
administration will deal with North Korea, including the communist regime's
denuclearization. And their greatest concern is being left out in the cold in a
possible rapid thaw of frozen ties between Washington and Pyongyang.
A summit between Obama and Kim Jong-il anytime soon may be a premature idea but
no one knows exactly what the next U.S. president will do for a breakthrough in
one of the most estranged diplomatic relationship on the planet. Some scenarios
even presume the new White House may try to reverse course, by normalizing ties
first to automatically disarm the isolationist regime.
Analysts here regard the North Korean media's frequent photo releases of their
reportedly convalescing leader as Pyongyang's signal that Kim is able and willing
to accept any olive branch from the Democratic administration.
Most hard to understand is what makes the Lee administration so hesitant to get
out of its own diplomatic snare. It was somewhat understandable for conservative
Lee to try to differ from his liberal predecessor by becoming harsher on the
North, which was also aimed in part to take the initiative in inter-Korean
rivalry.
But nine months are enough for Lee to have been engaged in a war of nerves for
nothing. In the worst case scenario, Lee will follow in the footsteps of the
former Kim Young-sam administration, which was left with a bill for a light-water
reactor while never playing a corresponding role in the nuclear settlement.
The change in U.S. political power is both a cause and opportunity for Seoul to
turn around and regain lost diplomatic leverage. Nothing but the Lee
administration's unproductive, shortsighted policy is marginalizing Seoul in
regional diplomacy.
(END)