North Korea-weekly review-6

NORTH KOREA NEWSLETTER NO. 42 (February 19, 2009)

*** OPINION FROM EXPERTS

North Korea's Anti-South Korea Campaign

By Cheon Seongwhun, Ph.D.
Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification, Seoul, Korea

The Kim Jong-il regime has launched an increasingly virulent stream of criticism
at the Lee Myung-bak government and the ruling conservative Grand National Party
since Lee was sworn in as the 18th president of South Korea. Although North Korea
has maintained a hostile posture towards South Korea's conservatives in the past,
President Lee's election seems to have precipitated further belligerence towards
South Korea. Maintaining a two-pronged approach -- lambasting South Korea with
verbal and physical threats on the one hand and attracting the United States with
a peace offensive on the other -- North Korea's current posture is creating
confusion about its intentions and fostering uncertainty about the future of the
Korean Peninsula.
North Korea has persistently demanded South Korea honor the two statements agreed
at two summit meetings, the June 15 declaration agreed with President Kim
Dae-jung in 2000 and the October 4 declaration signed by President Roh Moo-hyun
in 2007. While the Lee government has been reluctant to meet the North's demand,
saying merely it is willing to discuss how to implement the declarations, the Kim
regime has ratcheted up its rhetoric and expanded an anti-Lee government campaign
into the military sphere.
For instance, the spokesman of the General Staff of the (North) Korean People's
Army (KPA), on Jan. 17 this year, announced that the KPA would enter an "all-out
confrontational posture" against South Korea and counter any attempt to nullify
the self-designated demarcation line on the Yellow Sea. On Feb. 2, the spokesman
called on the United States and South Korea to dismantle their own nuclear
weapons and that denuclearization of the Korean peninsula be realized by mutual
nuclear disarmament rather than by unilateral dismantlement of the North Korean
nuclear arsenal. Antagonistic statements from the General Staff of the KPA are
likely to be a signal that inter-Korean relations are entering a military
confrontation stage, moving beyond a political struggle.

North Korea's Strategic Aims

At this juncture, we can suppose that North Korea has in mind both short-term and
medium-term objectives. In the short term, the Kim Jong-il regime is focused on
pressing the Lee government to change its North Korea policy in Pyongyang's favor
by demonstrating that the current policy results in raised tension levels. By
delivering psychological and physical impact on South Korean society, the Kim
regime will stir South Korean public opinion to demand the Lee government change
its North Korea policy. The KPA might initiate a preemptive attack and trigger
military clashes either on the Yellow Sea or in the DMZ. While carefully avoiding
doing damage to U.S. assets in South Korea, the KPA will try to resolve the
problems of the long-held armistice arrangements and lure the Obama
administration into tempting to change the status quo.
Any military campaign by the North would have economic as well as psychological
impact on the South. The South Korean economy, which faces difficulties due to
the global financial crisis, would be hit hard by any military clash, which would
affect stock markets, exchange rates, and foreign investment. Pro-North Korean
liberal factions would denounce the Lee government and demand reversal of the
North Korea policy in line with the sunshine policy of Presidents Kim Dae-jung
and Roh Moo-hyun. In short, Kim Jong-il may think that hostile military
adventures will make it possible to manipulate Seoul and also attract
Washington's attention, killing two birds with one stone.
In the medium term, North Korea is believed to be focusing on South Korea's next
Presidential election in 2012. Pyongyang will do its best for a liberal figure to
be elected, who would continue to implement the benign North Korea policies of
Presidents Kim and Roh. For this purpose, Kim Jong-il will attempt to weaken the
political basis of the Lee government and the Grand National Party.

The South's Response to the North's Hostile Campaign

South Korea should take on North Korea's hostile campaign in two ways. On the one
hand, Seoul should put skewed inter-Korean relations back on the right track. The
Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments committed two important strategic
errors: to fail to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons and to
damage the fundamental values of South Korea by maintaining a favorable attitude
towards the Kim Jong-il regime. The Lee government should reestablish national
entities of the country as a legitimate representative of the Korean nation on
the peninsula, and in sequence, normalize the inter-Korean relations by redeeming
mistakes made during the 10 years of the liberal governments.
The normalization is meant to manage the North-South Korean relations based on
the firm conviction that the two Koreas are at a temporary stage of division
heading toward a eventual peaceful unification rooted on democracy and market
economy. Successful normalization will require fair and objective evaluation of
the pros and cons of the North Korea policies of Kim and Roh governments and to
draw appropriate lessons for the future. Building a national consensus on the
North Korea policies of the previous governments is an essential element to
remedy so-called "South-South conflict" regarding North Korea issues. Such an
evaluation is not to hold someone accountable or to blame somebody. Knowing what
mistakes were made in the past is a prerequisite for forging a better North Korea
policy for the future.
On the other hand, South Korea should pursue a new North Korea policy according
to the proposition of separating the Kim Jong-il regime from ordinary people in
North Korea. Up until the present date, a myth has prevailed that North Korea is
a subject of dual nature. It is a psychological fixation that North Korea is an
entity of enmity as well as of cooperation. Arguing that the North-South Korean
relations are dual-natured, pundits have maintained that North Korea is a subject
to which South Korea should be vigilant as well as give assistance; one both
threatening and to be pitied. This long-held perspective has created much
confusion among the South Korean public on how to understand North Korea and much
dilemma in the South Korean bureaucracy on how to deal with Pyongyang regime. The
Roh Moo-hyun government tried to solve this dilemma by pronouncing that North
Korea was not South Korea's main enemy anymore. However, it was an unrealistic
and irresponsible policy, ignoring the harsh military situation across the
demarcation line.
As a way to break the long-held myth and get out of the dilemma, a new North
Korea policy should distinguish the North Korean regime from ordinary North
Korean people, based on the clear understanding that North Korea consists of two
entities -- the dictatorial regime on the one hand and the victimized people on
the other hand. This policy of bifurcation will not result in refusing to talk
with the North Korean regime but will ensure South Korea refrains from
intentionally assisting the leadership under the pretext of helping the North. By
focusing on the living of North Korean people, it will continue to provide
humanitarian assistance and at the same time, take on the regime by raising
issues like human rights, family reunion, and South Korean abductees. The
bifurcation policy is expected to fulfill the South Korean public's emotional
demand to help North Korean people and to draw international support as well by
meeting the consensus and norms of the international community. As a result, the
national image and credibility of South Korea will be enhanced to a considerable
degree.

The U.S. Response against North Korea's Aggressive Postures

The Obama administration is likely to put prime importance on restoring the
damaged alliance relationship with South Korea. In this context, the new U.S.
administration will carefully listen to the opinions of the South Korean
government in the process of formulating its North Korea strategy. Some in South
Korean society argue that the Lee Myung-bak government should revise its current
inflexible North Korea strategy, in order not to avoid being marginalized if
U.S.-DPRK relations radically improve during the Obama presidency. However, such
an opinion is groundless. The United States will be careful not to be trapped by
Pyongyang's tactic of playing Washington off against Seoul.
At the same time, the United States will pursue denuclearization of North Korea
through tough and direct diplomacy. The new administration will thoroughly
analyze the process and the achievements of the six-party talks during the past
five years, and promote high-level talks with North Korea as a means to
facilitate denuclearization. There is a possibility that liaison offices will be
established in Pyongyang and Washington within President Obama's first term in
office and a communication channel on ministerial or vice-ministerial level will
be established if North Korea responds favorably.
However, bilateral negotiation with Pyongyang will be based on realistic judgment
and experience, not on wishful thinking. As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
remarked, the Obama Administration does not have an illusions about negotiating
with North Korea. With the abrogation of the Geneva Agreed Framework, there are
many people in the Democratic Party who believe that they should not let
themselves be fooled by Pyongyang twice. Therefore, while elevating the level of
direct communication with North Korea in order to speed up the denuclearization
process, the new administration is likely to exert economic and diplomatic
pressure if North Korea does not give up its nuclear program. It will urge North
Korea to make a clear choice by presenting both the carrot and the stick. Soon
the ball will be in North Korea's court.
(END)