(EDITORIAL from the Korea Herald on May 27) - Useless exploit

Analysts here and abroad generally agreed that North Korea's second nuclear test on Monday was aiming at two things - recognition of its nuclear power status by the international community, and consolidation of Kim Jong-il's internal rule with stronger support from the military. With regard to the first point, such recognition would only be accompanied by deeper isolation. As for the second, Kim
is also revealing that he is highly dependent on the military to maintain his power.

North Korea surprised the world when it first detonated a nuclear device in
October 2006 but fell short of greatly impressing Washington or other parties in
the six-way denuclearization talks with what was then detected as a rudimentary
atomic bomb, smaller than a kiloton. This time, experts measured the nuclear
blast at 10 to 20 kilotons. Pyongyang's official news agency described the test
as "a higher level of explosive power and technology." Three missiles were fired
on the same day to boost the effect.
By choosing missiles of 130-kilometer range to accompany the nuclear test, North
Korea sent a sort of message to the United States: It wanted direct talks with
the new administration in Washington. President Barack Obama's instant response
was a condemnation that the nuclear test was an act of "blatant defiance" of the
U.N. Security Council and a violation of international law. He further denounced
Pyongyang for "directly and recklessly challenging the international community."
Pyongyang may still be expecting a special envoy from Washington of the level of
Al Gore or George Herbert Walker Bush, as is widely speculated. But, the start of
any such contact will be preceded by a UNSC action to slap new sanctions in
addition to those given under Resolution 1718 in 2006. China and Russia, which
had opposed a U.S. and Japanese bid to issue another UNSC resolution when North
Korea launched a long-range rocket in April, should now be more cooperative in
adopting a new punitive resolution.
North Korea said that Monday's underground nuclear test was aimed "at bolstering
our nuclear deterrent for self-defense." A "nuclear deterrent" as we understand
it in the North Korean sense is that it can make a retaliatory strike on Seoul or
Tokyo in case it comes under nuclear attack from the United States. With this
peculiar hostage strategy, Pyongyang wants to be recognized by the international
community as a nuclear state and treated as such.
The North is desperate to gain the capability to deliver a nuclear warhead to the
continental United States by 2012, the 100th birth anniversary of Kim Il-sung,
Kim Jong-il's father. This is the ultimate goal of the "military-first" policy,
the younger Kim's tribute to the 1 million-member People's Army when he was
consolidating his power after suddenly succeeding his father in 1994. Kim, now
67, finds himself physically undermined after a stroke last August and passing
his power to a trusted heir is his biggest problem.
Whereas he was groomed by his father for more than two decades before succession,
none of his three sons have had any comparable preparation to secure political
backing from the party or the military. Spectacular launches of missiles and the
rumbles of underground nuclear tests can satisfy the generals of the People's
Army and the Military Commission and keep them in allegiance while the succession
process is underway. There seems no other convincing explanation about the
North's series of nuclear and missile tests, which are otherwise seen as
pointless ventures.
(END)