Iran-Russia ties not subject to Intl. situation influence

TEHRAN, Jun. 08 (MNA) – Emphasizing the growing trend of relations between Tehran and Moscow, the Russian Ambassador to Tehran told MNA that the two states' ties are not subject to the influence of the current international situation.
Here is the text of Mehr News Agency's exclusive detailed interview with Alexy Dedov, the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Tehran.
The relations between Iran and Russia have been described as “strategic” over the past years. Do you think that these ties are strategic and the two neighbors can be called strategic partners?
Moscow highly values its friendly ties with Tehran, with whom we share common views on most global and regional issues. Our relations are based on longstanding traditions of friendship and good neighborliness, mutual understanding, and trust, and are characterized by a sincere desire for closer cooperation. We are committed to building a democratic and just world order based on universally recognized principles of international law, multilateralism, equal and indivisible security, and we pursue an independent and sovereign foreign policy. The achieved high level of foreign policy coordination is natural and logical. We actively cooperate on multilateral platforms, including the SCO, BRICS, and the EAEU, and have supported the accession of our Iranian friends to these organizations. Notably, none of our partners outside the CIS space holds corresponding status in all three of these major groupings.
Over the past decade, under the guiding role of the leaders of the two countries, ties between Russia and Iran have significantly strengthened, gaining historically unprecedented momentum and depth. We are pursuing a course to expand multifaceted cooperation in all key areas. The mutual desire to intensify the partnership is confirmed by frequent contacts—dozens—at the highest and senior levels. Intergovernmental, interparliamentary, and interdepartmental cooperation is successfully developing, while interregional and sister-city ties are also being strengthened.
Trade and economic cooperation is steadily growing. At the end of last year, growth reached 13.29%, a result close to the record levels of 2022. I am confident that this figure will be even higher, considering that the Free Trade Agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union and Iran came into force on May 15.
We are actively working to resolve the remaining issues to begin construction of the Rasht–Astara railway as soon as possible. We are continuing the construction of the second and third units of the Bushehr nuclear power plant and are implementing a number of other major investment projects in the energy sector.
Taking into account all of the above factors—the trust-based nature of our contacts and our national interests—the top political leadership of both countries has opted to elevate the level of relations. As President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin put it, the updated interstate treaty signed during the historic visit of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to Moscow on January 17, 2025, is “a truly breakthrough document that sets ambitious goals and outlines directions for deepening cooperation in the long term.” This is undoubtedly a landmark event. For the first time, relations have been granted the status of a comprehensive strategic partnership. This fully reflects the profound, qualitative changes that have taken place in the cooperation between Russia and Iran.
In your opinion, can the issue of "sanctions" be considered a challenge or a driving force in Iran-Russia relations? Accordingly, what measures have been taken to facilitate banking, foreign exchange, and trade exchanges between the two countries in dealing with the sanctions? Do you think the China and the UAE roadmap could be considered as a deterrent or a facilitator in Iran-Russia economic relations?
Undoubtedly, the illegal unilateral sanctions imposed against our countries are not only a serious challenge but also a driver for the growth of Russian-Iranian trade, economic, and investment cooperation. We are striving to fully utilize our existing potential, creating additional mechanisms to form favorable conditions and stimulate mutual trade.
For example, an independent payment infrastructure has already been created and is functioning successfully, allowing for transactions in national currencies. Their share now exceeds 95%. Mutual acceptance of national payment cards has been ensured—recently, our citizens gained the ability to make cashless payments for goods and services during reciprocal visits.
The entry into force of the Free Trade Agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union and Iran, which I mentioned earlier, will contribute to further liberalization of trade regimes by reducing and eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers. This concerns issues of market access, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and the simplification of customs procedures. In total, over the past three years, our legal and contractual framework has been expanded by 40 sectoral and interdepartmental documents, most of which aim to increase Russian-Iranian trade turnover.
The emergence of a multipolar world order is accompanied by a deepening crisis in economic globalization and an acceleration of the fragmentation of the global trading system under the influence of disrupted production and distribution chains and the collapse of market mechanisms. The algorithms of foreign economic cooperation are being reformatted. So what is our response to the changing conditions?
In addition to an independent financial infrastructure separate from the West and accompanying tools for supporting international trade, today, together with Iran, we are essentially creating a completely new continental transport artery—the North–South International Transport Corridor, which is becoming the central logistical axis of Eurasia.
Overall, we are interested in establishing multilateral cooperation and implementing joint integration projects with all constructively-minded countries, including our Iranian, Chinese, and Emirati friends.
The military-defense cooperation between Tehran and Moscow has been assessed as being at a good level, particularly in recent years. Could this type of cooperation be taken into account within the framework of the comprehensive strategic partnership agreement between Iran and Russia, which was signed on January 17, 2025?
Russian-Iranian interaction in the military sphere and in the field of military-technical cooperation is not a new phenomenon — it has been carried out for many decades, importantly, in full compliance with international law and not directed against the interests of third countries. Naturally, it is given attention in our new strategic treaty.
The treaty contains an article on not providing military or other assistance to an aggressor if one of the parties is attacked. The areas covered include training of military personnel, exchange of cadets and instructors, visits of warships to each other’s ports, participation in defense exhibitions, holding joint sports and cultural events, maritime operations for assistance and rescue, combating piracy and armed robbery at sea. Furthermore, in the interests of maintaining peace and security in the region, the treaty provides for conducting military exercises on the territories of the parties, as well as consultations to counter common military threats and security risks. Overall, the treaty systematizes and codifies the areas of cooperation that we have been engaged in over the past years.
At the international level, how could US President Donald Trump's approach to resolving the Ukraine issue and the possible agreement with Tehran affect Iran-Russia relations?
I must emphasize that the relations between our countries are weatherproof, strategic and not subject to the influence of the current international situation. These are the fundamental principles defined by the highest political leadership of both countries.
We advocate for a political-diplomatic settlement regarding Iran’s nuclear program on terms acceptable to our friends in Tehran, including the lifting of illegal unilateral sanctions. If necessary, we are ready to provide our partners with the required assistance, taking into account the experience and decisive contribution we made in concluding the “nuclear deal” in 2015.
We are grateful to our Iranian friends for their objective and balanced stance on the situation in Ukraine. We continue contacts with representatives of the US administration on the Ukrainian crisis. We provide detailed explanations about its root causes and genesis. We clarify our vision of the parameters for a settlement, taking into account Russia’s legitimate interests, primarily in the areas of security and human rights protection. It seems that our American interlocutors have come to better understand our position. There are signs that we are moving in the right direction.
Given the potential areas for cooperation between Iran and Russia, should Tehran's position in Moscow's foreign policy be considered as dependent on Russia's balancing game in the global system, or is there a need to increase cooperation and enhance Iran's status in Russian foreign policy?
I partially answered your question in my previous comment. Russian-Iranian relations are self-sufficient. Without a doubt, we still have much to do to bring trade and economic cooperation in line with the potential of our countries. At the same time, if we analyze the entire range of relations, it becomes clear that the Iranian direction is one of the highest priorities for Russian foreign policy. This is determined both by the status of the Islamic Republic as a major regional power and by its international standing, considering its full membership in the SCO, invitation to BRICS, and observer status in the EAEU. To understand how much attention the leadership of our countries pays to bilateral cooperation, I would like to once again refer you to the dynamics of high-level contacts. In my opinion, everything is clear here.