(EDITORIAL from the Korea Times on Oct. 7) - North`s conditional commitment Seoul needs far grander, longer-term diplomatic strategy

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il said Monday Pyongyang could return to the
six-party talks, depending on the progress of its bilateral meeting with the
United States.
Kim's inclusion of the six-nation conference in what the North has broadly dubbed
the multilateral forum seems to be the only visible outcome of the highly
publicized visit to Pyongyang by Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao ??? as far as
the nuclear issue is concerned.
For it is not even certain whether the communist regime would directly come back
to the six-way negotiation or try to set more intermediary stages even if the
outcome of the one-on-one talks with the United States proves to be satisfactory.

Chances are high that the Dear Leader can no longer rule out the six-country
format ??? sponsored by Beijing and favored by Washington ??? to prevent further
aggravation of the North's relationship with its biggest donor and backer on the
international stage. So it appears natural for both Seoul and Washington to
express a guarded welcome about the largely positive turn after a yearlong
impasse.
Anyway, the ball seems to be in the court of the U.S., which should decide when
to dispatch President Obama's nuclear envoy, Stephen Bosworth, to Pyongyang, and
under what conditions.
By most appearances, Washington is likely to continue to use its ``two-track"
approach, luring the isolationist regime back to the dialogue table with
incentives, and, at the same time, pressurizing it with the U.N.-led sanctions, a
tactic also supported by Seoul. But Pyongyang has made it clear it would respond
in kind, by preparing for dialogue while stepping up its nuclear programs. A case
in point was an unconfirmed report that the North has all but completed the
restoration of its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon.
All this would lead them back to square one ??? repetition of a tedious,
stop-and-go process of nuclear bargaining among six countries, which also include
Russia and Japan, over the past one-and-a half decades. So it would be tempting
enough to put an end to the protracted crisis in a one-shot deal, whether one
calls it a ``grand bargain" or ``comprehensive approach." The problem is that
Pyongyang is unlikely to accept it unless Washington and Seoul make enormous down
payments.
Noteworthy in this regard is Kim Jong-il's reiteration that the denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula was the last instruction of his father and founder of
North Korea, Kim Il-sung. Kim also stressed the need for turning the currently
hostile relationship between Washington and Pyongyang into a peaceful one,
insinuating the bilateral talks should go further than simple denuclearization to
diplomatic normalization.
Most worrisome against this backdrop is the possibility that the security issues
in Northeast Asia, including not just nuclear crisis but also the reshaping of
regional political orders, will become more and more like perennial problems that
increasingly go out of the hands of South Korea.
Which points to the need for Seoul to come up with a far grander and longer-term
strategy, instead of being mired in neck-and-neck competition with North Korea in
terms of ideological or systemic superiority.
We hope the current administration has such a strategy. Watching the government
cope with North Korea, however, it is hard to remain optimistic.
(END)